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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) currently provides disability benefits to 2.72 million
veterans of U.S. military service through the Disability Compensation (DC) program.  Until recently,
the medical eligibility criteria for this program were the same across service eras, with the key condition
being that the disability was caused or aggravated by military service.  But in July of 2001, the VA
relaxed the eligibility criteria for Vietnam veterans by including diabetes in the list of conditions covered
by DC.  This change was motivated by an Institute of Medicine report, which linked exposure to Agent
Orange and other herbicides used by the U.S. military in Vietnam, to the onset of diabetes.  In this
paper, we investigate the impact of this policy change on DC enrollment, expenditures, and the sensitivity
of the program to economic conditions.  Our findings demonstrate that the Agent Orange decision
increased DC enrollment by 7.6 percentage points among Vietnam veterans and that an additional
3.3 percent enjoyed an increase in their DC benefits.  Our estimates further suggest that the policy
change increased program expenditures by $2.69 billion during the 2006 fiscal year and by $45 billion
in present value terms.  After the policy took effect, we find that the sensitivity of the program to local
economic conditions increased substantially.  Taken together, our results suggest that even relatively
narrow changes in the medical eligibility criteria for federal disability programs can have a powerful
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In August of 2006, the U.S. Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) provided cash benefits to 
more than 11 percent of the nation’s 24 million military veterans through the Disability 
Compensation (DC) program.  Total program enrollment in that month was 2.72 million and 
expenditures for the 2006 fiscal year were approximately $25 billion.  To qualify for DC benefits, a 
veteran must have one or more disabilities that were caused or aggravated by his military service.  
The DC recipient then receives a monthly cash benefit along with essentially free medical care for 
the treatment of their disabilities through the Veterans Health Administration. 
Until recently, the medical eligibility criteria for DC benefits have been essentially the same 
for veterans from all service eras.  The key requirement was that a disability must have been caused 
or aggravated by military service.  Thus individuals rarely qualified for DC because of conditions 
such as cancer and diabetes that first affected people long after their period of military service and for 
which service-connectedness would be difficult to prove.  However in October of 2000 the National 
Institute of Medicine issued a report that linked exposure to Agent Orange, an herbicide used by the 
U.S. military in Vietnam, to the onset of diabetes.  In July of 2001, the VA responded to this report 
by adding diabetes to the list of conditions for which a veteran who served in Vietnam during the war 
could qualify for DC benefits.  There was no corresponding change for veterans from other eras. 
In this paper we aim to estimate the impact of this policy change on DC enrollment, 
expenditures, and the sensitivity of the program to local economic conditions.  Many previous 
authors have investigated these same types of issues for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) 
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the federal government’s two other major disability 
programs (Autor and Duggan, 2003; Black, Daniel, and Sanders, 2002).  However, virtually no 
previous work has investigated the causes or consequences of DC enrollment.
1
                                                 
1 In Bound and Burkhauser’s 1999 Handbook of Labor Economics chapter on disability programs, 44 papers focus 
on SSDI, 17 consider SSI, and just 1 study examines DC.  The one that considers DC is a descriptive paper that 
  1As Figure 1 demonstrates, the 2001 policy change coincided with a sharp break in trend in 
DC enrollment.  From 1996 to 2001, the number of DC beneficiaries grew by just 0.6 percent per 
year.  But during the next five years, the annual growth rate was five times greater at 3.3 percent.  Of 
course, other factors may have been at least partly responsible for this break in trend. We therefore 
use veterans from peacetime eras, almost all of whom served shortly before or after the Vietnam era, 
as our comparison group to estimate the effect of the policy.  While this group of veterans is clearly 
not a perfect control group, they had mortality rates and trends in DC enrollment that were quite 
similar to those for Vietnam-era veterans prior to the policy change as shown in Figure 2. 
Using aggregate data by service era in each year, our difference-in-differences estimates 
suggest that the expansion of the DC program’s eligibility criteria increased the number of Vietnam 
veterans on the program in September of 2006 by 175,000 over what it would otherwise have been.  
This increase represents 2.3 percent of all Vietnam-era veterans and 7.6 percent of those who actually 
served in Vietnam during the conflict there, as the policy change applied only to this latter group. 
An additional possible effect of the Agent Orange decision was that Vietnam veterans 
already on the program could increase their monthly benefits if they were found to have diabetes.  
The DC program pays benefits that are an increasing function of the recipient’s combined disability 
rating (CDR).  The CDR depends on the ratings for all of a recipient's rated disabilities, and thus a 
recipient who could obtain a rating for another condition would typically experience an increase in 
monthly benefits.  Our results suggest that approximately 75,000 Vietnam veterans qualified for an 
increase in their benefits because of the 2001 policy change.  Combined with the effect on 
enrollment, this suggests that 10.9 percent of the veterans who served in Vietnam and were still alive 
in 2006 experienced an increase in their DC benefits or became eligible for the program because of 
the less stringent medical eligibility criteria. 
                                                                                                                                                             
compares the economic well-being of individuals who receive SSDI, SSI, DC, or Workers’ Compensation benefits 
(Burkhauser and Daly, 1999) in the U.S. with those who receive disability benefits in Germany. 
  2We next investigate the effect of the change in the DC program’s medical eligibility criteria 
on short and long-term expenditures for the program.  To do this we estimate the impact of the policy 
change on the number of Vietnam-era DC recipients with each of the eleven possible CDRs, and then 
multiply this by average monthly benefits within each CDR.  This algorithm captures the effect due 
to the increase in the number of recipients as well as the increase in benefits for some existing DC 
recipients.  Our estimates suggest that DC expenditures during the 2006 fiscal year were $2.69 billion 
higher than they would have been in the absence of the Agent Orange decision.  Aggregating the 
effect across all years, our estimates suggest that the present value of Disability Compensation 
spending increased by more than $45 billion as a result of the policy change. 
In our final empirical section, we explore whether the change in the DC program’s medical 
eligibility criteria influenced the sensitivity of the program to local economic conditions.  A large 
literature has explored this issue for other government programs, including AFDC/TANF (Hoynes, 
2000; Blank, 2001), Medicaid (Cromwell et al, 1986), food stamps (Ziliak et al, 2003), SSDI (Autor-
Duggan, 2003), and SSI (Black, Daniel, and Sanders, 2002; Rupp and Stapleton, 1998).  The 
likelihood of such a link for the DC program is not as clear as for these other programs given that DC 
benefits are not means-tested and thus the number eligible for the program does not increase as 
economic conditions deteriorate.  Despite this, it is still plausible given that the demand for new 
sources of income is likely to be greater among those who are out of work or have low earnings. 
Our findings demonstrate that DC expenditures did increase much more rapidly in high 
unemployment areas following the policy change.  We detect no corresponding relationship between 
DC expenditure growth and this measure of economic conditions just prior to the policy change.  
This result is robust to the inclusion of pre-existing trends in DC expenditures and is driven by 
spending on Vietnam-era veterans.  It therefore appears that the liberalization of the program’s 
medical eligibility criteria made spending for this one category of veterans more sensitive to local 
economic conditions but there is no corresponding change for their counterparts from other eras. 
  3Taken together, our findings for the VA’s Disability Compensation program suggest that 
changes in the medical eligibility criteria for disability programs can have a substantial impact on 
program enrollment and expenditures as well as on the responsiveness of the programs to economic 
conditions.  These findings are consistent with the results from recent research on other federal 
disability programs such as SSDI (Autor and Duggan, 2003).  But the main contribution of our study 
relative to work for other disability programs is that, because the change to DC applied only to 
Vietnam veterans, we can use other veterans as a comparison group to obtain a more reliable estimate 
of the policy impact.  Changes to the SSDI and SSI programs have applied equally to essentially all 
potential applicants of those programs, and it has therefore been difficult to disentangle the effect of 
changes to these programs from the effect of other factors such as macroeconomic conditions. 
 
II. The Department of Veterans Affairs and the Disability Compensation Program 
The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans of military 
service and their families.  At the end of the 2006 fiscal year, the VA estimated that there were 24 
million veterans residing in the U.S. and that an additional 45 million were potentially eligible for 
VA benefits as family members or survivors of veterans.  According to VA estimates, the number of 
living veterans fell by almost 10 percent from September of 2000 to September of 2006.
2
As Table 1 demonstrates, this change in the veteran population has been associated with a 
substantial change in its composition, both because of mortality among veterans from earlier eras and 
because of entry by those serving during the Gulf War era.  Most strikingly, the number of veterans 
from the World War II era declined by 44 percent (from 5.59 to 3.15 million) during this six-year 
period while the number of veterans from the Gulf War era increased by 51 percent (from 2.84 to 
4.30 million).  Veterans from the Vietnam era were the largest group in both years, with their ranks 
                                                 
2 The data on dependents and population were obtained from the VA’s website at http://www.va.gov/about_va/ and 
http://www.va.gov/vetdata/demographics/Vetpop2004/VP2004B.htm, respectively. 
  4declining from 8.01 to 7.63 million but their share of all veterans increasing from 30 to 32 percent.
3
It is worth noting that, while veterans are categorized based on their period of service, the 
number serving in specific conflicts tend to be much lower than the era-specific population data 
would suggest.  For example, a recent estimate by the VA suggests that just 2.3 million of the 7.7 
million Vietnam-era veterans alive in 2005 actually served in Vietnam. 
A. VA Programs and Expenditures 
Despite the significant decline in the veteran population since 2000, total VA expenditures 
have increased by an average of 6 percent per year during the same period.  Table 2 lists total VA 
spending by category for the 1998 through 2005 fiscal years.  As Table 2 shows, Compensation and 
Pension (CP) was the largest category of spending throughout this period, with the $32.1 billion in 
CP program benefits representing 46 percent of total spending by the VA during the 2005 fiscal year.  
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) provided medical care to 4.96 million patients during 
this same year at a cost of $30.7 billion.  The remaining $7.5 billion in VA spending was spread 
across several categories, including operating expenses, construction, insurance, housing assistance, 
vocational rehabilitation, training programs, and burial and memorial benefits. 
CP benefits are paid through four main programs.  The largest in terms of both enrollment 
and expenditures is the Disability Compensation program, which according to the data displayed in 
Tables 3A and 3B, accounted for 75 percent of CP enrollment and 74 percent of expenditures, 
respectively, during the 2005 fiscal year. The DC program pays benefits to disabled veterans of 
military service whose conditions were caused or aggravated by their military service.  The program 
is not means-tested and an individual’s DC benefits are not directly affected by his earnings.  This is 
in contrast to the SSDI and SSI programs, which substantially reduce recipients’ incentives to work.   
                                                 
3 According to the VBA’s 2004 Annual Benefits Report, the approximate service dates by era were: World War II 
(September 1940 – July 1947), Korea (June 1950 – January 1955), Vietnam (August 1964 – May 1975), and Gulf 
War (August 1990 – present).  Peacetime includes veterans who served during all other periods.  These population 
estimates assign veterans who served in two or more eras to their earliest era of service.  However a veteran who 
served during a conflict and during peacetime would always be assigned to the conflict.  
  5The Disability Pension (DP) program is targeted at low-income wartime veterans who either 
are age 65 or older or are permanently and totally disabled (regardless of service-connectedness).  
This program accounted for just 10 percent of CP enrollment and 9 percent of CP spending during 
the 2005 fiscal year.   Beneficiaries of both the DC and DP programs are eligible for health care 
through the VHA and their expenditures accounted for much of the $30.7 billion in VHA spending 
during this same year.
4  The VA also paid $4.5 billion in cash benefits to the survivors of 0.54 
million deceased veterans through the Death Compensation and Death Pension programs. 
B. The Disability Compensation Program 
To apply for Disability Compensation benefits, a veteran must submit an application at one 
of 63 regional offices of the Veterans Benefit Administration (VBA).  At this stage, the 'authorization 
unit' collects necessary information regarding the claimant's application.  These would include 
military service records and medical records from both VA medical facilities and private providers.  
The application is then forwarded to a Rating Board, which determines whether each disability for 
which an application is submitted is service connected and assigns an appropriate degree of disability 
according to the Schedule for Rating Disabilities.  These ratings range from 0 to 100 percent (in 10 
percent increments) depending on the type and severity of the disability, with more severe conditions 
receiving a higher rating.
5  The recipient’s combined disability rating (CDR) is a function of the 
individual ratings.  If the award is made for just one condition then the CDR is equal to the rating for 
that condition.  If the award is made for multiple conditions then the CDR is generally greater than 
any of the individual ratings, though the CDR is not simply a sum of the remaining ratings.
6
If a DC award is made, the CDR is used to determine the monthly cash benefit amount, 
                                                 
4 The VHA provides care to other veterans as well, with 4.96 million served by the VHA during the 2004 fiscal year. 
5 The possible ratings depend on the disability.  For example type II diabetes can have ratings of 10, 20, 40, 60, or 
100 percent, whereas arthritis can only be assigned a rating of 10 or 20 percent.  For a list of conditions and possible 
ratings see http://www.warms.vba.va.gov/bookc.html. 
6 If a claimant has multiple disabilities, only the claimant's residual ability is considered when determining the 
impact of the next disability considered.  For example, if a veteran has two disabilities rated at 50%, then only 50% 
of his ability is considered when determining the impact of the second disability.  Therefore, his CDR would be 
80%; the sum of 50% for the first and 25% for the second (.5*(1-.5)) rounded to the nearest increment of 10%. 
  6which is an increasing function of this rating.
7  The monthly benefit can increase beyond this base for 
DC recipients with a CDR of 30 percent or more and who have dependent spouses, children, or 
parents.  The benefit can also increase for those with ratings of 60 percent or more and who are 
deemed unemployable.  The second column of Table 4 lists the baseline monthly benefit amounts for 
the 2006 fiscal year by disability rating.  As the table shows, benefit amounts increase with the CDR 
and the dollar increment from one category to the next also increases with the CDR.  For example the 
monthly payment rates for ratings of 10, 40, 70, and 100 percent are $112, $485, $1099, and $2393, 
respectively.  The next three columns in the table show the adjustments to these baseline amounts if 
the veteran has one or more dependents. 
  The first three columns of Table 5 list the total number of recipients, the total benefits paid, 
and the average monthly benefit in each CDR category in June of 2006 (the most recent month 
available).  The average payment to the 2.70 million DC recipients in that month was $780 for a total 
of $2.11 billion in cash benefits.  Those with ratings between 0 and 20 percent accounted for 45 
percent of recipients but just 9 percent of dollars paid.  The corresponding shares for those with 
ratings at or above 70 percent were 21 and 62 percent, respectively.
8
  As the next several columns of this table demonstrate, there was considerable variation across 
service eras in the distribution of the combined disability rating.
9  For example, among Vietnam era 
DC recipients, 32 percent had CDRs of 70 percent or more.  The corresponding share for DC 
recipients who incurred their disabilities during the Gulf War era was just 13 percent.  Because of 
this, average monthly benefits also varied widely by service era, from a low of $578 for Gulf War 
veterans to a high of $1029 for veterans serving in Vietnam. 
                                                 
7 The VBA considers the average reduction in earnings capacity to determine the benefit amount associated with 
each value of the CDR. 
8 The average amounts for those rated 60 percent and higher are much greater than the baseline amounts because 
many of these recipients are eligible for the 100 percent payment amount because they are deemed unemployable. 
9 DC recipients are assigned to eras based on where their most significant disability occurred.  This will introduce 
some measurement error in our estimates for era-specific DC enrollment rates because the population data are 
constructed differently, though the importance of this should not change significantly over short periods of time. 
  7C. The DC Program’s Medical Eligibility Criteria 
  In a typical year more than 70 percent of DC applicants apply for benefits for more than one 
condition.  One of three outcomes is possible – outright rejection, an award for some but not all 
conditions, or an award for all conditions.  During the 2000 fiscal year, 14 percent of applications 
considered were awarded for all conditions, 48 percent for some conditions, and 38 percent were 
outright rejected (VBA, 2001).
10  During the course of the year a total of 83,159 DC awards were 
made, with the average number of rated conditions among new recipients equal to 3.2. 
  Until July of 2001, the medical eligibility criteria for DC benefits were essentially the same 
across service eras.  Any veteran who was honorably discharged and whose disability did not result 
from his willful misconduct could qualify for DC benefits if his disability “was a result of disease or 
injury incurred or aggravated during active military service.”  Many conditions would clearly have 
resulted from military service.  For example if a soldier lost one or more limbs during a battle then 
there would be no uncertainty about whether the injury was service-connected.  The same would also 
be true for scars, the most commonly compensated condition among DC recipients.  The existence of 
such a causal link for the typical tinnitus (persistent ringing in the ears) or post-traumatic stress 
disorder application might be somewhat less clear cut, though still certainly plausible.
11
  Proving that such a link existed for a condition such as diabetes would undoubtedly be much 
more difficult.  Indeed a 2000 report by the National Academy of Sciences argued that the most 
important determinants of diabetes were physical inactivity, family history, and obesity.  The report 
further argued that any increased risk posed by wartime exposure to herbicides appeared to be small 
or nonexistent (NAS, 2000).  Despite this, approximately 1.6 percent of DC recipients had diabetes 
                                                 
10 These decisions are frequently appealed.  Existing DC recipients can also apply for an increase in their benefit 
amount, either because of an increase in the severity of a rated condition or because a new health problem arises. 
11 A listing of the top twenty impairments at the end of each fiscal year can be found in the VBA’s annual report.  In 
September of 2000 more than 12 percent of DC recipients had “scars, other” as one of their qualifying conditions.  
Next most common were skeletal conditions (10.6 percent), knee impairment (9.8 percent), and arthritis due to 
trauma (8.0 percent).  Tinnitus (6.2 percent) and PTSD (5.8 percent) were the 6
th and 9
th most common conditions. 
  8as one of their covered conditions in September of 2000.  While this share is not trivial, diabetes was 
not one of the twenty most common conditions among DC recipients at that time, nor was it one of 
the ten most common conditions for DC recipients from any of the five major service eras. 
 
III. The Institute of Medicine Report on Agent Orange Exposure 
While the DC program’s medical eligibility criteria were essentially the same for all military 
veterans up until July of 2001, the types of disabilities incurred undoubtedly varied across service 
eras.  For example, one might expect a significantly higher rate of service-connected post traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) among DC recipients who served in the Vietnam War than among their 
counterparts from other eras given the intensity of the conflict there.  And this was indeed the case, 
with 13.3 percent of DC recipients from the Vietnam era receiving compensation for PTSD in 
September of 2000 versus just 2.2 percent of all other DC recipients (VBA, 2001). 
Another reason that the disabilities incurred might vary across service areas is that different 
weapons and techniques were used by the U.S. military and their opponents over time.  One notable 
example of this is the use of herbicides in the Vietnam War.  Agent Orange was one of fifteen 
herbicides used by the U.S. military to defoliate trees that might otherwise provide cover to opposing 
forces.  Although the use of Agent Orange did not begin until 1965, it represented more than 80 
percent of the 19 million gallons of herbicides sprayed in Vietnam (VA, 2003). 
Soon after the war ended, many Vietnam veterans voiced concerns about the possible long 
term effects of exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides used in Vietnam.  In response to these 
concerns, the VA established the Agent Orange Registry in 1978, which provided voluntary medical 
examinations to veterans who served in Vietnam between 1962 and 1975.  Thirteen years later, the 
Agent Orange Act of 1991 was enacted, which charged the National Academy of Sciences’ Institute 
of Medicine with conducting a review of the existing scientific literature regarding the possibility of 
a link between Agent Orange exposure and the prevalence of certain medical conditions. 
  9In a series of five reports released between 1994 and 2003, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
grouped forty different medical conditions into one of four categories – (1) sufficient evidence of an 
association between Agent Orange and the condition (2) limited or suggestive evidence of an 
association (3) inadequate or insufficient evidence and (4) limited or suggestive evidence of no 
association.  Interestingly, none of the four categories required causal evidence.  In the first three 
reports, diabetes was placed in the third category, with the IOM concluding that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish an association between dioxin exposure and the onset of diabetes. 
But soon after the third IOM report was released in 1999, two new studies were released that 
provided supporting evidence of an association between dioxin exposure and diabetes (Calvert et. al., 
1999; AFHS, 2000).  In October of 2000, the IOM evaluated the new studies in the context of 
previous research and concluded that there was suggestive evidence of an association between Agent 
Orange exposure and the onset of diabetes (IOM, 2000).  This moved diabetes from category three to 
category two.  In response to this report, the Secretary of the VA announced in November of 2000 
that type II diabetes would be compensable under the DC program and, more importantly, that 
diabetes would be “presumptively” service-connected among those veterans who served in 
Vietnam.
12  Diabetes would not become compensable, however, until July of 2001. 
  Shortly after this policy change, the growth in total DC enrollment increased substantially, as 
shown in Figure 1.  From September of 1996 to 2001, the number of DC recipients increased by just 
0.6 percent per year.  But during the next five years the annual growth rate was 3.3 percent, 
suggesting that the expansion in the eligibility criteria for Vietnam veterans was the main cause.  
However this was not the only possible explanation for the increase in the rate of DC 
enrollment growth.  For example, the Veterans Claim Assistance Act, which was enacted in 2000, 
required the VA to provide more assistance to DC applicants from all eras and to add more resources 
                                                 
12 No such presumption was made for other Vietnam-era veterans, with the exception of those who served in Korea 
in either 1968 or 1969 because the U.S. military used herbicides there during this period as well (VA, 2005). 
  10to the processing of DC applications (GAO, 2002).  Similarly the economic downturn and the 
corresponding increase in the unemployment rate may have caused some veterans to seek out 
alternative sources of income.  And finally, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may have led to a 
significant increase in the prevalence of disabilities among veterans serving in these conflicts.  In the 
next two sections we estimate the impact of the policy change on DC enrollment and expenditures 
while attempting to control for the effects of these and other potentially confounding factors. 
 
IV. The Effect of the Agent Orange Decision on Enrollment in the DC Program 
Theoretically, one would expect the Agent Orange decision to have increased the propensity 
of veterans who served in Vietnam to apply for DC benefits.  As Parsons (1980), Bound (1989), and 
others have noted, a key determinant of an individual’s decision to apply for disability benefits is the 
probability that an award is made.  It seems likely that this award probability increased following the 
July 2001 policy change, especially for Vietnam veterans who knew they had diabetes.  But it may 
also have increased the incentive for other Vietnam veterans.  For example, a veteran who thought 
there was some chance that he had diabetes might go for a medical checkup.
13  This medical checkup 
could identify other health problems, and thus he could subsequently qualify for the DC program 
even if he did not have diabetes. 
The policy change would also have increased the incentive for existing DC recipients who 
served in Vietnam to apply for an increase in their monthly benefit.  As described above, a veteran’s 
DC benefit is a function of the combined disability rating (CDR), which generally increases when an 
additional condition is rated at 10 percent or more.  Thus the Agent Orange decision could have 
increased both DC enrollment and the amount of benefits paid to existing DC recipients. 
A. Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact on DC Enrollment 
                                                 
13 According to a CDC report (2003), approximately one third of diabetics in US are undiagnosed.  See Singleton 
(2006) for an analysis of self-reported rates of diagnosed diabetes among veterans and non-veterans in response to 
the Agent Orange decision. 
  11In its publication titled Annual Benefits Report, the Veterans Benefit Administration provides 
detailed information each year on the characteristics of individuals receiving DC benefits at the end 
of the previous fiscal year.  This information includes the number of DC recipients with certain 
diagnoses, the number with each of the eleven possible combined disability ratings (0 to 100 
percent), the average monthly benefit received, and many other variables of interest.  This data is 
further broken down by service era, which can be used to estimate the impact of the policy change 
described above on enrollment in the DC program. 
Because the Agent Orange decision differentially affected veterans who served in the 
Vietnam War, one can essentially use veterans from other eras to control for other changes occurring 
at the same time that might also have affected DC enrollment.  For example, the Veterans Claim 
Assistance Act that was passed in the year 2000 influenced the DC application and award process for 
veterans from all eras (GAO, 2002).  To the extent that this policy, the economic downturn, and other 
factors did not have a different effect on Vietnam veterans than on veterans from other eras, their 
effects could be captured by the time effects Θt in the following difference-in-differences model: 
∑
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In this model, the outcome variable DCjt, is equal to one if individual j received DC benefits in year t 
and zero otherwise.  The variable Vietnamj is equal to one if individual j is a Vietnam era veteran and 
zero otherwise.  POSTt is set equal to one after the policy takes effect, though to the extent that the 
impact is not immediate it may be more appropriate to allow the policy’s impact to vary over time.
14  
The parameter of particular interest in this model is β3, which is the coefficient on the interaction 
between the Vietnamj and POSTt variables and represents the impact of the policy change on the 
probability of DC enrollment among Vietnam era veterans.  The key assumption for reliable 
                                                 
14 Note that the inclusion of year indicators in this model makes it unnecessary to add a POST variable separately, as 
this would then be a linear function of certain year indicators. 
  12estimation of β3 is that there are not unobserved factors that influence DC enrollment differentially 
for Vietnam era veterans following the policy change. 
Ideally when estimating a difference-in-differences model such as this one, the treatment and 
comparison groups would be identical on background characteristics such as age, education, and 
other possible determinants of DC enrollment.  Of course, veterans who served in Vietnam will differ 
from other veterans in many respects.  For example, they are older on average than Gulf War 
veterans and younger than veterans who served in Korea.  But to the extent that the enrollment effect 
of these differences does not change at the time of the policy change, it should be captured by era-
specific fixed effects and era-specific time trends. 
B. Choosing the Comparison Group 
The data summarized in Table 6 lists the number of veterans receiving DC benefits by 
service era in September of each year from 1998 to 2006.  This table also lists the percentage change 
in this number from the previous year, the number of veterans in each service era, and the fraction of 
veterans receiving DC benefits.  Before considering the effect of the 2001 policy change, three points 
are worth noting from this table.  First, the number of DC recipients who served in World War II is 
declining steadily throughout this time period because of the high mortality rate among this group.  
Second, the number of DC recipients who served in the Gulf War era increased rapidly throughout 
this period.  While this has largely been driven by an increase in the number of Gulf War era veterans 
(those serving since August 1990), the increase in the fraction receiving benefits from 9.6 to 16.2 
percent has been nearly as important.  And finally, the trends from 1997 to 2000 in DC enrollment 
are fairly similar for the other three service eras.  During this period, DC enrollment increased by an 
average of 0.8 and 1.7 percent per year, respectively, among Vietnam and peacetime era veterans, 
while declining by an average of 2.2 percent per year among those serving in the Korea conflict. 
Given these trends, it seems clear that veterans from either the World War II or Gulf War 
  13eras would not be an appropriate comparison group for estimating the effect of the 2001 policy 
change on DC enrollment. Which of the other two eras is more appropriate is not as obvious.  On the 
one hand, just prior to the Agent Orange decision, peacetime and Vietnam era veterans had similar 
rates of DC enrollment at 8.6 and 9.3 percent, respectively.   The corresponding rate among Korean 
War era veterans was much lower at 4.9 percent.  And in terms of average age, those classified as 
peacetime were much more similar to Vietnam era veterans because most served either shortly before 
or after the Vietnam War.
15  But on the other hand, many veterans from the Korean and Vietnam War 
eras incurred their disabilities in a military conflict and thus their service-connected disabilities may 
be more similar.  But this seems unlikely to be as important as the age and DC enrollment 
similarities, and we therefore use individuals who served in peacetime as our comparison group. 
C. The Impact of the Agent Orange Decision on DC Enrollment Rates 
Figure 2 displays the fraction of Vietnam and peacetime era veterans receiving DC benefits 
in September of each year from 1998 through 2006.
16  As is clear from the figure, the trends for the 
two groups were fairly similar from 1998 to 2001, with the rate of enrollment increasing from 9.0 to 
9.4 percent among Vietnam veterans and from 8.1 to 8.7 percent among peacetime veterans.
17  The 
trend for the peacetime group was quite similar during the next five years, with 9.7 percent of 
peacetime veterans receiving DC benefits by the end of the 2006 fiscal year.  But the 3.0 percentage 
point increase in DC enrollment among Vietnam era veterans was exactly three times as large during 
this same five-year period, with their enrollment rising from 9.4 to 12.4 percent.  Our difference-in-
                                                 
15 According to data from the VA, the average ages of Korea War, Vietnam War, and peacetime era veterans in 
September of 2002 were 72, 57, and 53, respectively.  Table 1 demonstrates that veterans who served between the 
Korean and Vietnam War eras accounted for 53 percent of the peacetime era veteran population in September of 
2000, with those serving after Vietnam but before the Gulf War era accounting for an additional 44 percent.  
16 As described above, the assignment of DC recipients to eras (the numerator) differs somewhat from the 
assignment of veterans to eras for population estimates (the denominator).  For example, to be counted as peacetime 
in the population data a veteran must have served only in peacetime.  To be assigned to peacetime as a DC recipient 
the veteran must have incurred his most severe disability during peacetime.  This will introduce measurement error 
in our estimated enrollment rates.  But as long as the impact of this has a smooth trend over time, it should not bias 
this comparison or the results that follow. 
17 The trends are similar through 2001 as well, though as our diagnosis data below demonstrates, the policy change 
had already started to have an effect by the end of 2001 and thus we consider it as post policy here. 
  14differences estimate of the effect of the Agent Orange decision on the change in DC enrollment from 
September of 2001 to September of 2006 is therefore 2.0 percent.
18
Our baseline estimate of 2.0 percentage points does not account for the fact that the pre-
existing trends in DC enrollment were slightly different for veterans from the Vietnam and peacetime 
eras.  We next account for this by assuming that the average annual increase for each group from 
1998 to 2001 continued for the next five years.  Given this assumption, the predicted rates of DC 
enrollment in September of 2006 for peacetime and Vietnam era veterans were 9.6 and 10.1 percent, 
respectively.  The actual rate of 9.7 percent for our control group was almost identical to their 
predicted rate.  But the same was not true for veterans from the Vietnam era, whose actual DC 
enrollment of 12.4 percent was 2.3 percentage points higher in 2006 than predicted. 
  Given that there were approximately 7.6 million Vietnam-era veterans alive in September of 
2006, this latter estimate suggests that the Agent Orange decision increased DC enrollment by 
175,000 above what it otherwise would have been by September of 2006.  But this decision applied 
only to the 2.3 million veterans who served in Vietnam.  Thus the expanded eligibility criteria 
induced a 7.6 percentage point increase in DC enrollment among those veterans who actually served 
in Vietnam.  Furthermore, this increase can explain more than 53 percent of the acceleration in 
overall Disability Compensation enrollment since September of 2001 that is apparent in Figure 1.
19
 
V. The Effect on Existing DC Recipients and on Program Expenditures 
  The results in the previous section estimated the effect of the Agent Orange decision on the 
                                                 
18 This estimate and the one in the next paragraph would be almost identical if we instead used 2000 as the baseline.  
One possible source of bias in this estimate is that DC recipients who served both in peacetime and in Vietnam 
could, after qualifying from diabetes, switch from being classified as peacetime era to being classified as Vietnam 
era.  While there is no way to rule out this possibility, the fact that the trend in DC enrollment for peacetime era 
veterans did not change significantly after 2001 suggests that it is not an important source of bias. 
19 The number of DC recipients increased at a 0.64 percent annual rate from 1998 to 2001.  Had this growth 
continued during the next five years, the number of DC recipients would have been 329,044 lower in September of 
2006.  Thus the induced increase of 175,000 accounts for more than 53 percent of this.  Essentially all of the 
remaining acceleration is attributable to the growing importance of entry by Gulf War veterans and the declining 
importance of exits by World War II DC recipients. 
  15number of veterans receiving DC benefits but this did not include any resulting increase in benefits 
for existing DC recipients.  In this section, we estimate this latter effect by using aggregate data from 
the VBA’s Annual Benefits Report on the diagnoses of new and existing DC recipients in each year.  
We then investigate the effect of the policy change on total DC expenditures, which incorporates 
both the benefits paid to new recipients and the increase in benefits for existing recipients. 
A. The Number of Vietnam Veterans Experiencing an Increase in DC Benefits 
The top two rows of Table 7 list the number and percentage, respectively, of DC recipients 
receiving compensation for diabetes in each year.  At the end of the 2000 fiscal year, just 1.6 percent 
of DC recipients were paid for this condition, with this fraction unchanged from the previous year.  
But in the years following the 2001 policy change, this percentage increased consistently, reaching a 
peak of 7.5 percent by the end of 2004 (the most recent year of this VBA data).  This increase was 
driven almost entirely by Vietnam era DC recipients, with 18.5 percent of them receiving 
compensation for diabetes in September of 2004 versus just 1.7 percent of all other DC recipients.
20  
Just three years after the policy change, diabetes had become the most frequently compensated 
condition among Vietnam era DC recipients after not being in the top ten in September of 2001. 
The number of Vietnam-era DC recipients compensated for diabetes increased from 18,993 
in September of 2000 to 163,485 by September of 2004.  This increase reflects the coverage of 
diabetes among both new and existing DC recipients, though the VBA does not report how many of 
the new diabetes cases were already receiving DC at the time of the policy change.  To estimate this, 
we first calculate how many new DC recipients would have been covered for diabetes by September 
of 2004 if the number of new diabetes awards in each year had remained at its 2000 level.
21  Using 
                                                 
20 Values in this table with an asterisk were imputed.  See the notes to Appendix Tables 1 and 2 for a description of 
our imputation procedure.  2004 is unfortunately our most recent year of diagnosis data. 
21 There were 101,732 new diabetes awards from 2001 to 2004 versus the 2,368 (= 592 * 4) that we estimate would 
otherwise have been made. This is lower than the increase in the number of Vietnam-era DC recipients by 
September of 2004, perhaps because many of the applications had diabetes rejected but other conditions accepted. 
The most common outcome of a DC application is to have one or more conditions accepted and others rejected. 
  16the data listed in Appendix Table 2, we estimate that the total number of new awards for diabetes 
after the Agent Orange decision would have been lower by 99,364 during this period.  If one makes 
the conservative assumption that none of these awardees would have exited the program by the end 
of 2004, then an additional 45,128 individuals who were receiving DC benefits at the time of the 
2001 Agent Orange decision enjoyed an increase in their benefits by September of 2004 because 
their diabetes was covered.
22  However, this estimate excludes the number enjoying an increase in 
benefits during the 2005 and 2006 fiscal years, and we therefore inflate this estimate by two-thirds to 
arrive at our estimate of 75,213 for the number of existing DC recipients who enjoyed an increase in 
their monthly benefits because of the Agent Orange decision.
23
When combined with the results from the previous section, our estimates suggest that 
approximately 250,000 Vietnam veterans enrolled in DC or enjoyed an increase in their DC benefits 
by September of 2006 as a result of the Agent Orange decision.  This represents approximately 10.9 
percent of the 2.3 million veterans who served in Vietnam and were still living at that time. 
B. The Impact on Short and Long-Term Disability Compensation Expenditures 
The effect of the Agent Orange decision on Disability Compensation expenditures depends 
on the characteristics of both those newly awarded DC benefits and of their counterparts already on 
the program who enjoyed an increase in their DC benefits.  The main determinants of the short-term 
increase in spending are the CDR of new recipients and the increase in the CDR for existing 
recipients.  If the 175,000 Vietnam veterans awarded benefits all had a CDR of just 10 percent, for 
example, then the effect on spending would be relatively modest.  The same would be true if the 
75,000 enjoying an increase in their benefits rose from a CDR of 10 to just 20 percent. 
To estimate the effect of the Agent Orange decision on benefits paid, one would ideally use 
                                                 
22 To calculate this, we subtract the increase in the number of Vietnam era veterans with diabetes from 2000 to 2004 
(144,492) from the increase in the number of new DC recipients with diabetes as a covered condition (99,364). 
23 Some of those applying for an increase in benefits may have applied for multiple conditions or for an increase in 
ratings for existing conditions.  Even if their diabetes applications were turned down, some recipients may have 
enjoyed an increase in benefits because of the application.  This is one reason that our estimate may be too low. 
  17individual-level longitudinal data on DC enrollment and benefit amounts for all veterans.  This would 
allow us to estimate which new recipients enrolled in the program because of the policy change and 
which existing recipients enjoyed an increase in their benefits.  Aggregating up the monthly benefits 
for these individuals, we could then calculate the effect on DC spending.  Unfortunately we do not 
have this type of data.  An (admittedly imperfect) alternative is to utilize aggregate data on the 
distribution of CDRs by service era in the years leading up to and following the policy change.  As in 
the previous section, here we control for pre-existing trends in DC spending among Vietnam-era 
veterans to estimate the change that would have occurred in the absence of the Agent Orange 
decision if the pre-2000 trends had continued through June of 2006 (the most recent month 
available).  Specifically we estimate the annual change from 1998 to 2000 in the number of Vietnam 
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with VDC,j,t equal to the number of Vietnam era DC recipients in CDR j in year t.  We attribute any 
difference between the actual and predicted number of recipients within each CDR to the Agent 
Orange decision.  To estimate the effect on spending we simply multiply these CDR-specific effects 
by the average monthly benefit amount for that CDR.  If our assumptions are accurate, this estimate 
captures the spending effect that is attributable both to new recipients and to existing recipients. 
Of course, the trend in the number of Vietnam era DC recipients for each CDR may have 
changed after 2000 even in the absence of the change in the program’s medical eligibility criteria.  
For example, the Veterans Claim Assistance Act, the economic downturn, and related factors could 
have induced a break in trend.  We therefore follow our approach from above and use veterans from 
the peacetime era as a control group.  If our algorithm does a reasonable job of predicting the actual 
change in the number in each CDR bin for this group, it suggests that our estimates for the effect of 
                                                 
24 We multiply by 5.75 because we are considering the change from September of 2000 to June of 2006. 
  18the Agent Orange decision are not biased significantly by potentially confounding factors. 
The results from this analysis are summarized in Table 8.  The first and second panels 
include data for Vietnam and peacetime era veterans, respectively.  The first three columns of the top 
panel list the number of Vietnam era veterans on the DC program with each of the eleven possible 
CDRs in 1998, 2000, and 2006, respectively.  An examination of this data suggests that, despite the 
fact that the number of DC recipients was not changing much from 1998 to 2000, the distribution of 
the CDRs was.  For example the number of DC recipients with ratings between 10 and 40 percent 
ratings declined by 3 percent, while the corresponding number with ratings between 50 and 100 
percent increased by 12 percent.  A similar pattern existed for peacetime era DC recipients from 1998 
to 2000, with an increase of just 1 percent for ratings between 10 and 40 percent versus an increase 
of 13 percent for ratings between 50 and 100 percent.  These pre-existing trends suggest that, even in 
the absence of the policy change, the distribution of CDRs among Vietnam and peacetime era DC 
recipients would have changed after the Agent Orange decision. 
The fourth column lists the change in the number with each CDR that would have occurred 
from September of 2000 to June of 2006 if these pre-existing trends had continued.  To calculate 
these predicted changes, we use equation (2) above.  According to our estimates, the number of 
Vietnam era veterans with a rating of 10 percent would have fallen from 227,800 to 201,658 while 
the number with a rating of 100 percent would have increased from 85,994 to 109,172 during this 
five year period.  The first of these two estimates is relatively accurate, as the number with a ten 
percent rating in June of 2006 was 206,429.  But the latter estimate is much too low, with the actual 
number rated at 100 percent standing at 137,020 at the end of our period. 
The discrepancy between our estimates and the actual change for all eleven possible CDRs is 
listed in column six.  In every case our estimates are too low, which is not so surprising given the 
substantial increase in DC enrollment among Vietnam era veterans from 2000 to 2006.  But in 
general the discrepancies are greatest for the highest CDRs.  For example, we predicted an increase 
  19of 38,752 in the number with ratings of 80 percent or more, but the actual increase was substantially 
higher at 100,937.
25  Multiplying these CDR-specific discrepancies by the average monthly benefit in 
June of 2006 for each CDR, we estimate that DC expenditures were $2.69 billion higher during the 
2006 fiscal year than they would have been if the pre-2000 trend had continued.  This represents 
more than 23 percent of benefits paid for Vietnam-era DC recipients in the 2006 fiscal year. 
The bottom panel repeats this exercise for veterans from the peacetime era.  In this case the 
discrepancies between our predictions and the actual number in each CDR are much smaller.  As was 
true for Vietnam era veterans, we tend to underestimate more for the higher CDRs, though the total 
estimated dollar value of our discrepancies is just $0.02 billion for the 2006 fiscal year, which is 99.4 
percent lower than the corresponding estimate of $2.69 billion for Vietnam era DC spending.  
Additionally, this represents just 0.4 percent of DC spending on peacetime era DC recipients.  The 
similarity between actual and predicted DC expenditures for peacetime era veterans suggests that our 
estimate for the effect of the Agent Orange decision on Vietnam era DC spending is not driven by 
other factors such as macroeconomic conditions or the Veterans Claims Assistance Act. 
  Of course, the Agent Orange decision did not only affect expenditures during the 2006 fiscal 
year, but in several previous years and in many future years as well.  To estimate the impact of the 
Agent Orange decision on the present value of DC spending, we take the following simple approach.  
First, for the 2002 to 2005 fiscal years, we simply linearly interpolate the 2006 estimate.  This would, 
for example, assume that 40 percent of the $2.69 billion expenditure effect had occurred by 2003.  
For future years, we deflate the 2006 estimate by the VA’s estimated decline in the Vietnam era 
veteran population.  For example, the VA estimates that their ranks will decline by 16.2 percent from 
2006 to 2016, and we therefore assume an expenditure effect of $2.26 billion in that latter year.
26
                                                 
25 This would be surprising if DC recipients with diabetes had low benefits on average.  But in December of 2004 
the average benefit was 19 percent greater among Vietnam-era DC recipients with diabetes than among their 
counterparts without diabetes.  This is because recipients with diabetes tend to also be covered for other conditions. 
26 The VA indexes DC benefits to the Consumer Price Index and thus we do not scale for the effect of inflation. 
  20Using this algorithm along with an annual real discount rate of 3 percent, we estimate that the 
present value of DC spending increased by $45 billion dollars (in 2006 dollars) as a result of the 
policy change.  For two reasons, this estimate is likely to understate the actual effect on the present 
value of VA spending.  First, it assumes that there is no effect beyond the 2006 fiscal year on the 
number of DC recipients or on the benefits paid for existing DC recipients.
27  Second, it does not 
incorporate the effect on health care spending for DC recipients through the Veterans Health 
Administration, which we cannot reliably estimate with the available data.  On the other hand, the 
estimate may be biased upward given that mortality rates of Vietnam-era DC recipients affected by 
the Agent Orange decision are likely to be higher than for the average Vietnam era veteran.  But even 
when we adjust our present value calculations to account for the higher baseline mortality rates of 
Vietnam era DC recipients,
28 our estimated effect falls by just 19 percent to $37 billion. 
 
VI. The Sensitivity of DC Expenditures to Local Economic Conditions 
  In contrast to the SSDI and SSI programs, an individual can receive DC benefits even if he 
has substantial labor market earnings.  Thus whereas previous work has found that local economic 
conditions influence SSI and DI enrollment and expenditures (Black, Daniel, and Sanders, 2002; 
Autor and Duggan, 2003), it is not obvious that such a link would exist for the DC program.  But this 
previous research has also shown that, when the medical eligibility criteria for the SSDI program 
were liberalized, the sensitivity of the program to economic conditions increased.  Thus while one 
might expect a smaller impact of economic conditions on DC expenditures than on spending for 
other disability programs, this effect may have increased following the 2001 policy change. 
There are a number of possible channels through which economic conditions might influence 
DC expenditures.  Perhaps the most obvious one is that veterans without a job or with a job that has 
                                                 
27 It also neglects any effect beyond 2033, as the VA does not make population projections beyond that year. 
28 The mortality rate in 2000 of Vietnam era DC recipients was 1.55% versus 0.71% for all Vietnam era veterans.  
We therefore scale the estimated mortality rates for all Vietnam veterans by 2.18 when calculating the present value. 
  21low wages are likely to have a greater demand for alternative sources of income than their observably 
similar counterparts with higher earnings.  Additionally it seems plausible that a veteran would need 
to invest a considerable amount of time and effort to learn about and apply for the program.  Because 
the opportunity cost of time will be lower for those who are out of work or have low paying jobs, this 
time cost may be less likely to dissuade them.  Similarly, advocacy groups and other institutions may 
have responded to the change in the DC program by launching outreach efforts in those parts of the 
country where Vietnam veterans were known to have relatively few labor market opportunities. 
To investigate whether the relationship between the DC program and labor market conditions 
changed after the Agent Orange decision, we utilize annual, county-level data on expenditures by the 
VA on the four Compensation and Pension programs described in Section 2.
29  The available data 
does not separate out DC spending from spending on the other three programs.  But as Table 3B 
demonstrates, almost 75 percent of Compensation and Pension spending is for the DC program.  
Additionally changes in Compensation and Pension spending after 2001 were primarily driven by the 
DC program, with total expenditures for the other three programs growing by an average of less than 
one percent per year from 2001 to 2004 versus a seven percent annual rate for the DC program. 
We merge this Compensation and Pension (CP) expenditure data with annual, county-level 
unemployment rate data.
30  If local economic conditions had an important impact on the response of 
veterans to the change in economic conditions, one would expect to find a larger increase in CP 
expenditures in places with high rates of unemployment at the time of the policy change.  To 
investigate this issue, we estimate models of the following type: 
jt t j t j t j jt Pop Log CPSpending Log UnempRate Spending CP Log ε β β β α + ∆ + ∆ + + = ∆ − − ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3 ( , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1
 
                                                 
29 Data on enrollment in these programs at the county level are not available.  One advantage of considering 
expenditures rather than enrollment is that expenditures would capture the increase in benefits for existing recipients 
whereas enrollment would not.  Virtually every county in the U.S. has nonzero CP spending in each year considered. 
30 We obtained these data from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics.  This data is available 
online at http://www.bls.gov/lau/.  
  22in which we use the log change in CP spending as our dependent variable.  In all specifications we 
include the estimated change in the number of veterans living in the county.
31  In some 
specifications, we also control for the pre-existing trend in CP expenditures, as places with worse 
economic conditions may have been experiencing different changes in CP spending at the time of the 
policy change.   The parameter of interest in this equation is β1, which represents the relationship 
between the county unemployment rate and the change in CP expenditures.  We consider two time 
periods, the three years prior to (1998-2001) and the three years following (2001-2004) the policy 
change.  If the Agent Orange decision increased the sensitivity of the program to economic 
conditions, one would expect β1 to increase from the pre-policy to the post-policy period. 
  Our estimates for these models are summarized in Table 9.  The first two columns present the 
results from specifications for the 1998 to 2001 period, with the second one controlling for the pre-
existing trend in CP spending.  The statistically insignificant estimate for β1 in both specifications 
suggests that areas with high rates of unemployment in 1998 did not experience larger increases in 
CP spending during the next three years.  But the next two columns reveal that such a relationship 
did exist for the 2001 to 2004 period.  The point estimate of 0.883 in the fourth specification implies 
that an increase of one-percentage point in the county's 2001 unemployment rate was associated with 
a 0.9 percent greater increase in CP spending from 2001 to 2004.
32
  In the next four columns we present the results from specifications in which we pool data 
from these two periods.  Here we interact the unemployment rate measure with a POST indicator, 
which allows us to determine if the change in β1 from the pre-policy to the post-policy period is 
statistically significant.  We find that it is, and this significance remains when we introduce state 
fixed effects in the next two specifications.  We do this to account for the possibility that state VBA 
                                                 
31 To estimate this we obtained the total number of veterans by county in 1990 and 2000 from the decennial census.  
We then calculated the growth rate and used this to impute the population estimate in 1998, 2001, and 2004. 
32 Our results were qualitatively similar when we used the change in the level (rather than the log) of CP spending 
per veteran.  For example, the analogous estimate for the specification summarized in column 2 was an insignificant 
-133 whereas the estimate from specification 4 was significant at the 1 percent level and equal to 2471. 
  23offices differ in their outreach efforts or in their probability of making a DC award. 
  In the last two specifications we present the results from models in which the explanatory 
variable is the change in the unemployment rate rather than its level.  The coefficient estimates of 
interest from these models, while not statistically significant, are qualitatively similar to the ones 
from the previous columns, suggesting that CP expenditures became more sensitive to local 
economic conditions after the policy change. 
  While the timing of the change in the relationship between economic conditions and CP 
expenditures is consistent with the hypothesis that the Agent Orange decision increased the 
sensitivity of the program to economic conditions, we probe further on this issue by investigating 
whether the increase in DC expenditures is significantly positively related with the fraction of DC 
benefits paid to Vietnam veterans diagnosed with diabetes.  To do this we use aggregate, county-
level DC spending in December of 2004 and differentiate between spending on Vietnam era veterans 
with diabetes and all other DC spending.
33  The results of our analysis are summarized in Table 10. 
The first two columns of this table explore whether the log change in CP spending from 2001 
to 2004 was significantly higher in counties where Vietnam veterans accounted for a relatively large 
share of spending.  The significantly positive estimates of .171 (without pre-existing trends) and .198 
(with trends) on the fraction of DC spending to Vietnam era veterans suggests that this was indeed 
the case.  This is in contrast to the 1998 to 2001 period, when there was no evidence of a 
significantly positive relationship, as is shown in the last two columns of the table. 
The two explanatory variables included in specifications 3 and 4 differentiate between DC 
spending for Vietnam veterans with diabetes and all other DC spending for Vietnam veterans.  As the 
coefficient estimates show, there is a significantly positive relationship between the change in CP 
spending and the fraction of DC spending paid to Vietnam veterans with diabetes.  No corresponding 
relationship exists for DC spending on other Vietnam veterans.  This strongly suggests that the 
                                                 
33 December of 2004 is the only month in which we have diagnosis-specific DC expenditures at the county level. 
  24coverage of diabetes for Vietnam veterans is responsible for the changing relationship between 
spending by the VA on Compensation and Pension programs and economic conditions. 
It is worth noting that while the results presented here suggest that the sensitivity of the DC 
program to economic conditions increased as a result of the Agent Orange decision, other factors 
may be at least partly responsible for our findings.  For example, it could be the case that the 
prevalence of diabetes among Vietnam veterans is greater in counties with high unemployment rates.  
But our finding is consistent with the results of Autor and Duggan (2003) for the SSDI program, 
which found that the sensitivity of that program to economic conditions increased following the 
liberalization of the program's medical eligibility criteria in the mid-1980s.  Such a connection for the 
DC program seems plausible given that the demand for alternative sources of income is likely to be 
greater among veterans affected by the policy who have low earnings or are out of work. 
 
VII. Discussion 
  The findings in this paper suggest that a change in the medical eligibility criteria for the VA's 
Disability Compensation program that applied only to Vietnam veterans induced a 7.6 percentage 
point increase in disability enrollment among this group and increased the monthly benefit amount 
for an additional 3.3 percent.  The effects of this change on VA expenditures were substantial, with 
our estimates suggesting that DC spending during the 2006 fiscal year was $2.69 billion higher than 
it otherwise would have been and that the present value increase in VA expenditures was 
approximately $45 billion.  These estimates for enrollment and expenditures are likely to be 
conservative, as we have not considered any effect on veterans not already affected by June of 2006 
nor have we incorporated the resulting increase in health care spending through the Veterans Health 
Administration.  Our results further demonstrate that the 2001 policy change has coincided with a 
change in the responsiveness of the DC program to local economic conditions. 
  What do these findings imply for other disability programs such as SSDI and SSI?  Because 
  25only the 2.3 million veterans who served in Vietnam were directly affected by this policy change, it 
is clear that one cannot assume that a similar change for those programs would have the same 
response.  Additionally, because the DC program is quite different from SSDI and SSI, which pay 
benefits on an all-or-nothing basis and do not allow recipients to have significant labor market 
earnings, the effect of such a change for these other programs might be quite different.  However the 
findings do demonstrate that a relatively narrow change in the medical eligibility criteria for the DC 
program led to an increase in disability benefits for 10.9 percent of the individuals potentially 
affected by the policy.  This makes it more plausible that the 1984 reforms to SSDI and SSI, which 
expanded the medical eligibility criteria for these programs, could have been largely responsible for 
the significant increase in enrollment for these two programs during the past two decades. 
  A potentially important direction for future research would be to estimate the effect of the 
induced increase in DC enrollment on the health, labor supply, and material well-being of veterans 
who served in Vietnam.
34  As a result of this policy change, more Vietnam veterans received 
essentially free health care through the Veterans Health Administration.  This, along with the 
increase in benefits, could plausibly have improved the health of Vietnam veterans.  Similarly while 
the DC program does not introduce a high marginal tax rate on earnings, it is plausible that a DC 
award or an increase in DC benefits could reduce labor supply through an income effect. 
  More generally, the VA’s Disability Compensation program is a large and rapidly growing 
program that has essentially been ignored in prior economic research.  At present there are 2.72 
million veterans receiving DC benefits with $25 billion paid in benefits during the 2006 fiscal year.  
More work on this program, which is an increasingly important source of income and insurance for 
the nation’s 24 million veterans and 45 million of their family members, seems warranted.
                                                 
34 Gruber (2000) uses a similar strategy to the one employed in this paper to estimate the effect of a change in 
Canada's disability program on labor supply.  He exploits the fact that Quebec operated a separate program and uses 
individuals from that province as his control group. 
  26References
Air Force Health Study (2000).  "Air Force Health Study: An Epidemiological Investigation of 
Health Effects in Air Force Personnel Following Exposure to Herbicides.  1997 Follow-up 
Examination Results."  Brook Air Force Base: Air Force Research Laboratory. 
 
Autor, D., & Duggan, M. (2003).  "The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline in 
Unemployment."  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 157/206. 
 
Autor, D., & Duggan, M. (2006).  "The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal 
Crisis Unfolding."  Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20 (3). 
 
Black, D., Daniel, K., & Sanders, S. (2002).  "The Impact of Economic Conditions on Participation 
in Disability Programs: Evidence from the Coal Boom and Bust."  American Economic Review, 
92(1), 27-50. 
 
Blank, R. (2001).  "What Causes Public Assistance Caseloads to Grow?"  Journal of Human 
Resources, 36(1), 85-118.   
 
Bound, J. (1989). "The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants."  American 
Economic Review, 482-503. 
 
Bound, J., Burkhauser, R.V. (1999).  "Economic Analysis of Transfer Programs Targeted on People 
with Disabilities."  In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.) Handbook of Labor Economics, 3C.  New 
York: Elsevier Science Pub. Co. 
 
Burkhauser, R.V., & Daly, M.C. (1999).  "Disability and Work: The Experience of American and 
German Men."  Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review 2, 17-29. 
 
Calvert, G., Sweeney, M., Deddens, J. and D. Wall (1999). “An Evaluation of Diabetes Mellitus, 
Serum Glucose, and Thyroid Function among U.S. Workers Exposed to 2, 3, 7, 8-tetrachlorodibenzo-
p-dioxin.”  Occupational and Enviormental Medicine, 56: 270-276. 
 
Center for Disease Control (2003).  "Prevalence of Diabetes Impaired Fasting Glucose in Adults – 
United States, 1999-2000."  Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 52(35). 
 
Cromwell, J., Hurdle, S., & Wedig, G. (1986).  "Impacts of Economic and Programmatic Changes on 
Medicaid Enrollments."  Review of Economics and Statistics, 68(2), 232-240. 
 
Duggan, M., & Imberman, S. (2006).  "Why Are the DI Rolls Skyrocketing?  The Contribution of 
Population Characteristics, Program Changes, and Economic Conditions."  forthcoming in D. Cutler 
and D. Wise (Eds.) Health at Older Ages.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.    
 
Gruber, J. (2000).  "Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply."  Journal of Political Economy, 
1162-1183. 
 
Hoynes, H (2000).  “Local Labor Markets and Welfare Spells: Do Demand Conditions Matter?”  
Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(3), 351-368. 
 
  27Kessler, R. et al. (2003).  “Prevalence and Treatment of Mental Disorders, 1990 to 2003.”  New 
England Journal of Medicine, 352(24), 2515-2523. 
 
Kubik, J. (1999).  "Incentives for the Identification and Treatment of Children with Disability: The 
Supplement Security Income Program."  Journal of Public Economics, 73(2), 187-215. 
 
Institute of Medicine (2000).  "Veterans and Agent Orange: Herbicide/Dioxin Exposure and Type 2 
Diabetes."  Washington D.C.: The National Academies Press. 
 
Institute of Medicine (2003).  "Veterans and Agent Orange: Update 2002."  Washington D.C.: The 
National Academies Press. 
 
Parsons, D. (1980).  "The Decline in Male Labor Force Participation."  Journal of Political Economy, 
88(1), 117-134.   
 
Rupp, K., & Stapleton, D. (1998).  "Growth in Disability Benefits: Explanations and Policy 
Implications."  Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Insitute for Employment Research. 
 
Singleton, P. (2006).  "The Effect of Disability Insurance on Health Investment."  University of 
Maryland, Mimeo. 
 
Social Security Administration (2006).  Annual Statistical Supplement, 2005.   
 
United States General Accounting Office (2002).  "Veterans’ Benefits: VBA’s Efforts to Implement 
the Veterans Claims Assistance Act Need Further Monitoring."  GAO-02-412. 
 
United States Department of Veterans Affairs (2003).  “Agent Orange Brief.”  Environmental Agents 
Service, (131) A1. 
 
Veterans Benefits Administration, Selected Years.  VBA Annual Benefits Report.  Available online at 
http://www.vba.va.gov/reports.htm. 
 
Ziliak, J., Gundersen, C., & Figlio, D. (2003).  "Food Stamp Caseloads over the Business Cycle."  
Southern Economic Journal, 69(4), 903-919. 
 










































































Peacetime2000 2006 % Change 2000 2006
World War II Era 5.59 3.15 -43.6% 21.1% 13.1%
Between WWII and Korea 0.24 0.16 -33.3% 0.9% 0.7%
Korean War Era 3.50 2.76 -21.1% 13.2% 11.5%
Between Korea and Vietnam 2.88 2.54 -11.8% 10.8% 10.6%
Vietnam War Era 8.01 7.63 -4.7% 30.2% 31.8%
Between Vietnam and Gulf War 3.49 3.45 -1.1% 13.1% 14.4%
Gulf War Era 2.84 4.30 51.4% 10.7% 17.9%
Total # of Veterans 26.55 23.98 -9.7% 100.0% 100.0%
Share Number in Millions
Table 1: Veteran Population Estimates by Era of Service in September of 2000 and 2006
Data includes the number of veterans alive in September of 2000 and September of 2006 from each of seven 
different service eras.  Individuals who served during a conflict and during peacetime are assigned to the 
conflict.  Individuals serving during two or more of the four conflicts are assigned to the earliest conflict.  Data 
were obtained from the VA's VP04 Ver 1.0 population estimates, which are available online at 
http://www.va.gov/vetdata/demographics/ and represent the VA's most recent estimates as of September, 2006.  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Compensation and Pension $23,532 $24,231 $24,138 $24,927 $27,479 $29,698 $30,807 $32,068
Medical Expenditures $21,087 $20,786 $23,267 $23,600 $25,073 $27,014 $29,086 $30,675
Education & Voc Rehab $1,716 $1,814 $1,848 $1,715 $2,153 $2,398 $3,081 $3,155
Insurance and Indemnities $2,435 $2,307 $2,223 $2,148 $2,063 $1,995 $1,928 $1,809
Operating Expenses $1,539 $1,517 $1,698 $1,722 $1,933 $1,999 $2,003 $2,238
Construction $655 $552 $396 $444 $481 $445 $438 $303
Total Spending $50,964 $51,206 $53,569 $54,556 $59,182 $63,549 $67,343 $70,248
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Disability Compensation 2,277,049 2,294,453 2,308,186 2,321,103 2,398,287 2,485,229 2,555,696 2,636,979 2,725,472
Disability Pension 390,978 378,712 364,220 348,052 346,579 346,555 342,903 335,787 329,492
Death Compensation 310,299 311,631 313,408 313,540 315,731 319,998 324,019 329,184 331,909
Death Pension 291,483 274,106 257,106 241,467 230,267 223,553 215,253 206,594 200,130
Total C&P Recipients 3,269,809 3,258,902 3,242,920 3,224,162 3,290,864 3,375,335 3,437,871 3,508,544 3,587,004
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Disability Compensation $16,298 $16,755 $17,430 $19,095 $20,736 $21,290
Disability Pension $2,520 $2,444 $2,396 $2,470 $2,530 $2,530
Death Compensation $3,897 $3,892 $3,926 $3,873 $4,027 $4,011
Death Pension $807 $750 $715 $705 $701 $692
Total Estimated $23,520 $23,842 $24,467 $26,274 $27,993 $28,523
Table 2: U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs Expenditures: 1998-2005
Table 3B: Compensation and Pension Expenditures by Program: 1999-2004
Table 3A: Compensation and Pension Recipients by Program: 1998-2006
Data represents VA expenditures by category (in millions of 2005 dollars).  Data for the 1999-2004 fiscal years is available online at 
http://www.va.gov/vetdata/GeographicInformation/index.htm.   Data for 1998 and 2005 were obtained from the Department of Veterans 
Affairs following an email request.
Data represents the number of recipients of each program in September of each year.  Data for the 1999-2004 fiscal years is available onlin
from the VBA's Annual Benefits Report publication at http://www.vba.va.gov/reports.htm.  Data for the 1998, 2005, and 2006 fiscal years 
were obtained from the Department of Veterans Affairs following an email request
Data represents the total estimated expenditure by program in each fiscal year (in millions of 2005 dollars).  Data for the 1999-2004 fiscal 
years is available online from the VBA's Annual Benefits Report publication at http://www.vba.va.gov/reports.htm.  Totals differ slightly from 
those listed in Table 2 because this data is estimated while the data in Table 2 represents actual spending.1 child & Each Add'l Each Add'l
CDR Baseline 1 child 1 spouse 1 spouse Child < 18 In School 18+
10% $112 $112 $112 $112 $0 $0
20% $218 $218 $218 $218 $0 $0
30% $337 $364 $377 $406 $20 $64
40% $485 $521 $539 $578 $27 $86
50% $690 $735 $757 $806 $34 $107
60% $873 $927 $954 $1,012 $40 $129
70% $1,099 $1,162 $1,193 $1,262 $47 $150
80% $1,277 $1,349 $1,385 $1,463 $54 $172
90% $1,436 $1,517 $1,557 $1,645 $61 $193
100% $2,393 $2,484 $2,528 $2,626 $68 $215
Table 4: Monthly Disability Compensation Benefit Amounts During the 2006 Fiscal Year
Data represents the monthly benefit amount by combined disability rating (CDR) and presence of dependents for 
Disability Compensation recipients during the 2006 fiscal year.  This data and the corresponding data for earlier years 
can be obtained at http://www.vba.va.gov/bln/21/Rates/.  CDR Recipients Dollars Avg Benefit Gulf Vietnam Korea WW II Peacetime
0% 14,394           $ 1,075 $75 0.1% 0.3% 2.5% 1.4% 0.4%
10% 774,887         $ 87,336 $113 27.6% 22.0% 30.6% 33.2% 37.4%
20% 415,510         $ 91,437 $220 17.9% 13.4% 13.0% 12.5% 17.8%
30% 332,768         $ 124,874 $375 15.3% 10.7% 12.5% 13.2% 11.0%
40% 256,487         $ 139,326 $543 12.5% 9.0% 8.2% 8.1% 8.0%
50% 159,003         $ 121,343 $763 7.1% 5.9% 5.4% 5.8% 4.6%
60% 181,254         $ 230,850 $1,274 6.9% 7.0% 7.6% 7.1% 5.6%
70% 162,202         $ 302,969 $1,868 4.7% 8.5% 5.5% 5.3% 4.1%
80% 110,699         $ 229,674 $2,075 3.3% 5.6% 4.1% 4.0% 2.7%
90% 58,865           $ 133,267 $2,264 1.6% 3.1% 2.2% 2.3% 1.4%
100% 235,971         $ 645,755 $2,737 3.0% 14.6% 8.5% 7.2% 6.9%
Total 2,702,040      $ 2,107,906 $780 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
674,021 939,200 160,007 334,222 594,590
$389,318 $966,165 $126,226 $244,833 $381,364
$578 $1,029 $789 $733 $641
Share with Each Rating




Data in the first three columns provides the number of DC recipients, the total amount paid (in thousands of dollars), and the average 
monthly DC benefit by combined disability rating (CDR) in June of 2006.  Data in the last five columns provides the share of DC 
recipients from each service era with each value of the CDR.  Data were obtained from the Department of Veterans Affairs following an 
email request.Service Era 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
WWI + WWII # Receiving 578,459 541,312 505,133 470,217 440,477 413,702 385,504 356,194 327,570
% Change -6.1% -6.4% -6.7% -6.9% -6.3% -6.1% -6.8% -7.6% -8.0%
# Vets / 1000 6,544 6,044 5,582 5,155 4,732 4,319 3,916 3,526 3,151
% Receiving 8.8% 9.0% 9.0% 9.1% 9.3% 9.6% 9.8% 10.1% 10.4%
Korean War # Receiving 178,682 174,807 170,616 166,362 164,728 164,482 163,635 161,512 159,749
% Change -2.1% -2.2% -2.4% -2.5% -1.0% -0.1% -0.5% -1.3% -1.1%
# Vets / 1000 3,730 3,614 3,502 3,392 3,276 3,154 3,027 2,894 2,757
% Receiving 4.8% 4.8% 4.9% 4.9% 5.0% 5.2% 5.4% 5.6% 5.8%
Vietnam War # Receiving 729,402 735,627 740,976 749,554 798,549 848,156 883,092 916,220 947,601
% Change 0.8% 0.9% 0.7% 1.2% 6.5% 6.2% 4.1% 3.8% 3.4%
# Vets / 1000 8,113 8,060 8,007 7,955 7,901 7,848 7,781 7,709 7,629
% Receiving 9.0% 9.1% 9.3% 9.4% 10.1% 10.8% 11.3% 11.9% 12.4%
Peacetime # Receiving 549,862 560,567 566,833 569,190 575,413 582,863 587,331 591,324 595,634
% Change 2.1% 1.9% 1.1% 0.4% 1.1% 1.3% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7%
# Vets / 1000 6,753 6,683 6,614 6,546 6,473 6,397 6,316 6,231 6,142
% Receiving 8.1% 8.4% 8.6% 8.7% 8.9% 9.1% 9.3% 9.5% 9.7%
Gulf War # Receiving 240,644 282,140 324,628 365,780 419,120 476,026 536,134 611,729 694,918
% Change 19.2% 17.2% 15.1% 12.7% 14.6% 13.6% 12.6% 14.1% 13.6%
# Vets / 1000 2,510 2,669 2,838 3,017 3,199 3,474 3,753 4,027 4,297
% Receiving 9.6% 10.6% 11.4% 12.1% 13.1% 13.7% 14.3% 15.2% 16.2%
Total # Receiving 2,277,049 2,294,453 2,308,186 2,321,103 2,398,287 2,485,229 2,555,696 2,636,979 2,725,472
% Change 0.6% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 3.3% 3.6% 2.8% 3.2% 3.4%
# Vets / 1000 27,522 27,028 26,542 26,066 25,582 25,191 24,793 24,387 23,977
% Receiving 8.3% 8.5% 8.7% 8.9% 9.4% 9.9% 10.3% 10.8% 11.4%
Table 6: Veterans Receiving Disability Compensation Benefits by Service Era and Year: 1998-2006
Entries in this table represent the number of DC recipients, the number of veterans, and the fraction of veterans on DC by service era and year.  Population data were obtained from the VA's most r
population estimates (summarized in Table 1) and DC enrollment data were obtained from the VBA's Annual Benefits Report publication, which is available online at http://www.vba.va.gov/reports.h
the 1999-2004 fiscal years.  Data for 2005 and 2006 were obtained from the Department of Veterans Affairs in response to an email request.   September 2006 data were estimated by assuming that 
the average monthly increase from September of 2005 to August of 2006 continued in that final month of the fiscal year.1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
# with Diabetes 37808 37985 46395 111932 161551 191649
% with Diabetes 1.65% 1.65% 2.00% 4.67% 6.50% 7.50%
# Vietnam with Diabetes 18904* 18993* 27403* 88259 135011 163485
% Vietnam with Diabetes 2.57% 2.56% 3.03% 11.05% 15.92% 18.51%
# All Other with Diabetes 18904* 18992* 18992* 23673 26540 28164
% All Other with Diabetes 1.21% 1.21% 1.21% 1.48% 1.62% 1.68%
Table 7: The Fraction of DC Recipients and Awardees with Diabetes as a Covered Condition
The first two rows summarize the number and percentage of DC recipients with diabetes at the end of each 
fiscal year.  The next two rows provide this same information for Vietnam era veterans and the last two rows 
provide this data for veterans from all other eras.  Entries with an asterisk are imputed.  See Appendix Tables 
1 and 2 for an explanation of the imputation procedure.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Avg Monthly Est. Impact
CDR 9/1998 9/2000 6/2006 Predicted Actual Difference DC Benefit on 2006 DC $
0% 1,413 1,644 2,567 664 923 259 $75 $232
10% 236,893 227,800 206,429 -26,142 -21,371 4,771 $113 $6,453
20% 106,162 102,836 125,994 -9,562 23,158 32,720 $220 $86,405
30% 103,715 100,946 100,286 -7,961 -660 7,301 $375 $32,877
40% 66,412 66,094 84,843 -914 18,749 19,663 $543 $128,175
50% 42,490 43,772 55,642 3,686 11,870 8,184 $763 $74,950
60% 39,097 41,805 65,423 7,786 23,618 15,833 $1,274 $241,977
70% 29,063 38,443 79,443 26,968 41,000 14,033 $1,868 $314,527
80% 17,712 21,450 52,705 10,747 31,255 20,508 $2,075 $510,596
90% 8,513 10,192 28,848 4,827 18,656 13,829 $2,264 $375,693
100% 77,932 85,994 137,020 23,178 51,026 27,848 $2,737 $914,494
Total 729,402 740,976 939,200 33,275 198,224 164,949 - $2,686,380
Avg Monthly Est. Impact
CDR 9/1998 9/2000 6/2006 Predicted Actual Difference DC Benefit on 2006 DC $
0% 2,791 2,704 2,406 -250 -298 -48 $75 -$43
10% 242,816 239,621 222,500 -9,186 -17,121 -7,935 $113 -$10,733
20% 105,401 107,411 106,064 5,779 -1,347 -7,126 $220 -$18,817
30% 62,041 64,169 65,530 6,118 1,361 -4,757 $375 -$21,421
40% 38,409 41,738 47,361 9,571 5,623 -3,948 $543 -$25,734
50% 20,200 22,196 27,544 5,739 5,348 -391 $763 -$3,576
60% 22,104 25,477 33,496 9,697 8,019 -1,678 $1,274 -$25,652
70% 11,878 14,732 24,527 8,205 9,795 1,590 $1,868 $35,633
80% 7,230 9,048 15,864 5,227 6,816 1,589 $2,075 $39,568
90% 3,281 4,152 8,035 2,504 3,883 1,379 $2,264 $37,460
100% 33,711 35,585 41,263 5,388 5,678 290 $2,737 $9,532
Total 549,862 566,833 594,590 48,792 27,757 -21,035 - $16,216
Number of Recipients Change 2000-2006
Panel B: Peacetime Era DC Recipients
Table 8: Number of DC Recipients by Combined Disability Rating for Vietnam and Peacetime Era
Panel A: Vietnam Era DC Recipients
Number of Recipients Change 2000-2006
Data summarized in columns 1-3 represent the actual number of DC recipients by CDR in September of 1998 and 2000 and 
in June of 2006 for the Vietnam and peacetime service eras.  The next column lists the predicted change from 2000 to 2006 if 
the 1998-2000 trend had continued through June of 2006.  Columns 5 and 6 list the actual change and the discrepancy 
between the actual and predicted values.  Column 7 lists the average monthly benefit by CDR in June of 2006 and the final 
column multiplies this amount by 12 (to annualize) and by the discrepancy listed in column 6.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Unemp Ratet-1  0.059 -0.097 0.889*** 0.883*** 0.051 -0.122 -0.140 -0.188
(.181) (.160) (.258) (.230) (.182) (.158) (.129) (.132)
Post * Unemp Ratet-1  0.848*** 1.019*** 0.582*** 0.832***
(.230) (.293) (.178) (.242)
∆ Unemp Ratet -0.123 0.000
(.176) (.168)
Post * ∆ Unemp Ratet 0.614 0.325
(.533) (.476)
∆ Populationt  0.830*** 0.506*** 0.752*** 0.342*** 0.792*** 0.426*** 0.826*** 0.517*** 0.825*** 0.517***
(.131) (.209) (.159) (.183) (.138) (.186) (.110) (.188) (.106) (.190)
∆ Log(Comp+Pen)t-1  0.423*** 0.498*** 0.462*** 0.378*** 0.371***
(.156) (.122) (.136) (.163) (.163)
Year = 2004 0.121*** 0.102*** 0.136*** 0.114*** 0.159*** 0.151***
(.013) (.017) (.010) (.017) (.010) (.011)
Constant 0.063 0.042 0.183 0.137 0.063 0.040 0.072 0.048 0.066 0.040
(.007) (.013) (.018) (.022) (.007) (.012) (.005) (.012) (.002) (.011)
# Observations 3136 3136 3136 3136 6272 6272 6272 6272 6272 6272
R-squared 0.196 0.325 0.168 0.368 0.471 0.576 0.564 0.625 0.563 0.621
State Effects? No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 9: Determinants of County-Level Growth in DVA Compensation and Pension Expenditures: 1998-2004
1998-2001 2001-2004 1998-2004
Dependent variable in each column is equal to the change in the log of DVA Compensation and Pension expenditures.  This county level data was obtained at 
http://www.va.gov/vetdata/GeographicInformation/index.htm.  Specifications (1) through (4) include one observation for each county (either the 1998-2001 or the 2001-
2004 change) while specifications (5) through (10) include two observations per county.  The variable Unemp Rate is equal to the unemployment rate at the beginning of 
the period (thus either 1998 for the 1998-2001 change or 2001 for the 2001-2004 change).  The change in population variable is equal to the change in the log of the 
veteran population in the county.  The change in the log of Comp and Pen spending controls for the pre-existing trend in spending.  The variable Post is equal to one for 
the 2001-2004 change and zero otherwise.  All standard errors are clustered by state and all specifications are weighted by the veteran population in the county.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vietnam DC Fraction 12/04 .171** .198*** -0.038 -.100***
(.066) (.044) (.066) (.045)
Vietnam Diabetes DC Fraction 12/04 .590*** .500***
(.150) (.087)
Vietnam Other DC Fraction 12/04 -.004 0.071
(.076) (.045)
∆ Log(Comp+Pen)t-1  .578*** .566*** .551***
(.082) (.081) (.089)
Constant 0.112 0.068 0.129 0.082 0.069 0.067
(.032) (.023) (.030) (.021) (.031) (.022)
# Observations 3126 3126 3126 3126 3126 3126
R-squared 0.014 0.346 0.047 0.363 0.001 0.268
2001-2004 1998-2001
Table 10: Determinants of Growth in Compensation and Pension Expenditures: 1998-2004
The dependent variable in all specifications is equal to the log change in compensation and pension expenditures (from 2001-
2004 in columns 1 through 4 and from 1998-2001 in columns 5 and 6).  The first explanatory variable represents the fraction 
of DC spending in the county paid to Vietnam veterans in December of 2004.  The next two variables equal the fraciton of DC 
spending paid to Vietnam veterans with diabetes and the fraction of DC spending paid to all other Vietnam veterans, 
respectively.  All standard errors are clustered by state and all specifications are weighted by the veteran population in the 
county.Body System 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Musculoskeletal System 2204797 2280843 2346864 2412412 2524243 2652380 2786986
Skin 697081 711700 722474 731378 750407 770083 778521
Impairment of Auditory Acuity 463306 483532 505298 530931 587524 665419 742211
Neurological Conditions 302864 313252 322904 331653 369377 422448 581442
Mental Disorders 395329 403175 409071 414679 433618 463223 488333
Digestive System 424188 429546 432920 434606 440931 448128 452307
Cardiovascular System 326947 339195 348645 357259 385924 419039 442640
Respiratory System 286199 293179 298789 303890 314021 325106 334866
Endocrine System 56416 57576 58719 68040 134905 185908 217126
    Diabetes Only - 37808 37985 46395 111932 161551 191649
        Diabetes & Vietnam Only - 18904* 18993* 27403* 88259 135011 163485
        Diabetes & All Other - 18904* 18992* 18992* 23673 26540 28164
    Not Diabetes - 19768 20734 21645 22973 24357 25477
Genitourindary System 132164 136852 141583 145938 161387 180785 196268
Eye 103007 103704 104050 104472 108407 113553 117256
Infectious Diseases 49754 49042 47980 46714 46586 46576 46045
Gynecological System 28939 32004 34547 36667 39325 41905 44156
Dental and Oral Conditions 24715 25798 26798 27572 28924 30171 31114
Hemic and Lymphatic System 20354 20792 21153 21471 22216 23122 24996
Total 5516060 5699958 5842529 5989327 6370768 6812203 7309744
Appendix Table 1: Service-Connected Disabilities by Body System for DC Recipients at End of Fiscal Years
Data were obtained from the 2000 and 2004 versions of the VBA's Annual Benefits Report.  Entries with an asterisk 
were estimated because they were not publicly available.  We assume that the number of Vietnam DC recipients 
with diabetes is equal to the corresponding number of non-Vietnam DC recipients with diabetes in 1999 and 2000.  
This is likely to be approximately correct given that 46 percent of DC recipients with diabetes in October of 1998 
were from the Vietnam era.  We further assume that the number of non-Vietnam veterans with diabetes in 2001 is 
unchanged from its 2000 level.  The values for 2002, 2003, and 2004 are not imputed.Body System 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Musculoskeletal System 107400 119485 111663 110520 156339 164970 164297
Skin 32013 34236 30334 28047 41453 42766 36955
Impairment of Auditory Acuity 23370 27321 28654 31995 59241 75316 76836
Neurological Conditions 13124 13567 13261 12927 28794 33575 28922
Mental Disorders 17043 17680 16613 16065 25402 31022 23564
Digestive System 17873 18823 16807 15109 21501 22017 19078
Cardiovascular System 13638 15588 14594 14253 26643 28069 28315
Respiratory System 14855 15842 14423 14190 19304 20678 19239
Endocrine System 2350 2501 2485 5918 39852 36897 26206
    Diabetes Only - 1217 1183 4741 38652* 35697* 25006*
        Diabetes & Vietnam Only - 609** 592** 4150* 38061* 35106* 24415*
        Diabetes & All Other - 608* 591* 591* 591* 591* 591*
    Not Diabetes - 1284 1302 1177 1200* 1200* 1200*
Genitourindary System 6411 6716 6502 6270 13392 14993 12884
Eye 3129 3314 3043 2998 5320 5708 4774
Infectious Diseases 2486 2524 2280 2081 3300 3233 2702
Gynecological System 2958 3154 2678 2285 2795 2780 2487
Dental and Oral Conditions 1365 1533 1518 1310 2087 1915 1616
Hemic and Lymphatic System 985 1032 1025 923 1262 1484 1822
Total 259000 283316 265880 264891 446685 485423 449697
Appendix Table 2: Service-Connected Disabilities by Body System for New DC Recipients in Fiscal Year
Data were obtained from the 2000 and 2004 versions of the VBA's Annual Benefits report.  Entries with an asterisk 
were estimated because they were not publicly available.  We assume that the number of diabetes awards to 
Vietnam veterans was the same as the number of diabetes awards to all other veterans in the 1999 and 2000 fiscal 
years.  This is likely to be approximately correct given that 46 percent of DC recipients with a diabetes diagnosis in 
October of 1998 were from the Vietnam era.  We further assume that the number of diabetes awards to non Vietnam 
era veterans does not change after the 2001 reform, which seems reasonable given the much larger increase in 
diabetes cases among Vietnam veterans.  And finally, we assume that the number of endocrine system awards that 
are not diabetes remains unchanged following the 2001 reforms.  This seems reasonable given that the number of 
diabetes cases increased by 159,000 from 2000 to 2004 whereas the corresponding increase for other endocrine 
conditions was approximately 5,000.